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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1580 
____________ 
 
CHARLES BRIDGES, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY; JASPER J. BEDE;  
JANET LANDESBURG; REANA SWEENEY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 5-12-cv-02316) 
District Judge:  James Knoll Gardner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 20, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 6, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Charles Bridges, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) with the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”), appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief as well as the District Court’s dismissal of two supplemental pleadings.  
Bridges sought to enjoin his supervisors from temporarily removing him from hearing 
disability cases until he completed a ten-day training session on agency policies.  Bridges 
has since completed the training session and has returned to hearing disability cases.  We 
will dismiss the appeal as moot. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
Bridges is an ALJ with the SSA’s office in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  In June 
2010, Bridges lost his position as the Hearing Office Chief ALJ for the SSA’s Harrisburg 
office but remained an ALJ in that office.  Following his position change, Bridges filed 
this action against the Commissioner of the SSA and three individual ALJs for 
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1 and 
for various due process and tort claims.   
                                              
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
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The instant appeal, however, is limited to the District Court’s denial of Bridges’s 
motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that he filed on 
February 21, 2014.  On February 18, 2014, Bridges’s supervisors told him that he had 
been subjected to a “focused review of adjudicated SSA disability cases for fiscal year 
2013.”2  Based on this review—which SSA says showed that Bridges’s decisions in 
disability cases did not comply with SSA standards—Bridges was told he had to attend a 
ten-day training session.  During this ten-day period, Bridges would not hear disability 
cases, and his cases would be reassigned to other ALJs.  Through his motion for 
preliminary relief, Bridges sought to preserve the status quo, i.e., to enjoin his 
supervisors’ requirement that he attend the ten-day training session.  
The District Court scheduled a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion for 
February 24, 2014.  On the day of the hearing, however, neither Bridges nor his counsel 
appeared at the scheduled time and neither could be located.  Counsel for defendants 
appeared at the hearing and also filed an opposition to the preliminary injunction motion, 
arguing that Bridges could not show a likelihood of irreparable harm.  Based on the 
parties’ written submissions, the District Court denied Bridges’s motion because he could 
not satisfy any of the required elements for preliminary injunctive relief and because he 
failed to prosecute the motion.  Bridges filed a motion for reconsideration, but he 
withdrew the motion before the District Court ruled on it. 
                                              
2 (J.A. 34a (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
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In addition to the District Court’s denial of his preliminary injunction motion, 
Bridges’s notice of appeal stated that he was also appealing the District Court’s dismissal 
of his first supplemental pleading and its denial of his request to file a second 
supplemental pleading.  The first supplemental pleading concerned two positions Bridges 
applied for but allegedly was denied a meaningful opportunity to be considered for due to 
retaliation and discrimination based on his race.  The second supplemental pleading 
concerned a December 2013 change in the Hearing Office Chief ALJ position 
description.  Bridges alleged that the change in position description conferred new 
authority on the Regional Chief ALJ to remove a Hearing Office Chief ALJ, thus 
showing that his June 2010 removal from the position of Hearing Office Chief ALJ was 
unlawful. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court generally 
has jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).  But when something happens during the course of litigation that 
“prevent[s] a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 
dismissed as moot.”3  Specifically, “when the event sought to be enjoined in a 
preliminary injunction has occurred, an appeal from the order denying the preliminary 
                                              
3 Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996); see 
also Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “mootness is a 
jurisdictional issue”).   
  
5 
injunction is moot.”4  Here, Bridges sought to enjoin the action requiring him to attend 
training and temporarily reassigning his cases to other ALJs.5  He has since completed 
the training and has been reinstated to hear cases.6  His appeal is therefore moot.7  
 Additionally, we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s dismissal of 
Bridges’s supplemental pleadings because that dismissal was not a final decision 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will dismiss the appeal as moot. 
 
                                              
4 Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1991).   
5 (J.A. 31a (requesting the District Court to stay the “February 18, 2014 
employment action . . . pending disposition of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 
injunction”).) 
6 (Supplemental App. SA405–06.)   
7 Even if the appeal was not moot, we would affirm the denial of the preliminary 
injunction motion because Bridges has failed to make a clear showing of irreparable harm 
in the absence of preliminary relief.  Both before the District Court and this Court, 
Bridges has offered no evidence of irreparable injury and has instead argued that such 
injury should be presumed.  Bridges has not identified any authority for such a 
presumption, and this Court has expressly rejected such a presumption in employment 
discrimination cases.  See Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1127 (3d Cir. 1987).  
